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The purpose of this paper is to benchmark Tunisia against 
other emerging economies in terms of the regulatory 
barriers affecting particular services sectors, and to assess 
the economy-wide effects of further liberalizing these 
services trade restrictions, compared with reducing the 
dispersion in barriers to its merchandise trade. On the 
basis of a rather restricted sample of services sectors, 
partial regulatory reform would yield gains roughly 
equivalent to full unilateral reform of manufacturing 
tariffs, but roughly one-tenth the gains from full bilateral 
This paper—a product of the Social and Economic Development Department, Middle East and North Africa Region—is 
part of a larger effort in the department to assist countries of the region devise strategies for integrating services sectors to 
the global economy. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author 
may be contacted at ndiop@worldbank.org.  
reform of border protection in agriculture with the 
European Union. The adjustment costs associated with 
these services trade reforms would be minimal. The paper 
identifies the reasons why the gains from these services 
reforms are relatively small, and argues that a wider set of 
reforms could provide win-win outcomes and even fewer 
adjustment costs. By contrast, the gains in agriculture and 
manufacturing tend to come at the expense of domestic 
output in the reforming sectors—the gains are greater, 
but so too are the adjustment costs.   
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1. Introduction 
Tunisia has been one of the best performers in the Middle East and North Africa region 
since the mid-1990s, when it accelerated market-oriented reforms. Economic growth 
reached an average 5 percent in 1996-2007, despite many external shocks. As a result, the 
poverty incidence dropped to about 7 percent in 2007 (World Bank Global Poverty 
numbers 2008). Nevertheless, because of its strong trade ties with Europe, Tunisia’s real 
sector was affected by the global financial crisis through Europe’s 2009 recession. As a 
result of a sharp decline in exports (-12 percent in real terms), GDP growth was only half 
of what was predicted (3 percent against an expected 6 percent).  
Tunisia’s global integration policies can be traced back to 1971, when the country 
decided to create an offshore sector in order to reduce the anti-export bias inherent in the 
heavy protection of the economy. The offshore sector provided generous fiscal and 
financial incentives to exporters and triggered a rapid rise in foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and the birth of a large labour-intensive textile industry integrated vertically with 
the EU’s production networks. This heterodox trade policy stance — similar to the ones 
also applied at different points in time by Japan, Korea, Malaysia, and Mauritius — led to 
the first wave of diversification away from hydrocarbons. However, overall productivity 
growth was heavily constrained by the high level of protection of the economy.  
A decisive step toward liberalizing trade occurred in the middle of the 1990s. As part of 
the Tunisia-EU Association Agreement (AA), trade protection vis-à-vis the EU was 
scheduled for gradual and systematic dismantling, starting in 1996. As a result, tariffs on 
industrial goods imported from the EU (the source of 65 percent of Tunisia’s imports), 
went from about 100 percent in 1996 to 0 percent in January 2008. World Bank (2008) 
shows that Tunisia’s industrial sectors that are highly integrated to the global market have 
been able to attract investment, converge to EU’s labor productivity standards, and boost 
job creation. In sharp contrast, in the services sector where many entry and competition 
barriers remain, convergence to EU labor productivity standards is slow.  
Tunisia is now preparing to embark on bolder services liberalization. The sector currently 
provides 59 percent of GDP and absorbs 55 percent of employment. So far, the country 
has no free trade agreement (FTA) that includes services. Its multilateral liberalization of 
services under WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) has been very 
limited. Tunisia included only three sectors (tourism, telecommunications and financial 
services) in its GATS Uruguay Round commitments. While some of its sectors not 
included are quite open (e.g. maritime transport), entry into many other services sectors is 
restricted. Under the Uruguay Round, Tunisia bound without limitation many cross-
border (mode 1) transactions (e.g. in the financial sector), but in reality, those GATS 
measures overlap with strict foreign exchange controls, making them partly ineffective. 
Apart from the financing of current operations, opportunities for cross-border (mode 1) 
trade are sharply restricted, and foreign competition is mostly possible through 
commercial presence (mode 3) or through the presence of natural persons (mode 4). But 
the measures affecting the presence of natural persons (mode 4) remain unbound, with   3
the exception of wholly exporting enterprises that can recruit up to four executives and 
managers of foreign nationality.  
It is not clear whether Tunisia will significantly increase its commitments at the end of 
the ongoing Doha Round. In its conditional Doha offer of 2005, Tunisia maintained some 
restrictive horizontal commitments. For instance, freedom of investment would be 
guaranteed only to ‘wholly exporting’ firms and a nationality condition would be 
attached to the exercise of commercial activities (whole and retail trade) in Tunisia. In 
terms of sectoral coverage, five sectors were included in the conditional offer (out of 
eleven possible): telecommunications, environmental services, financial services, health 
services and tourism and travel.1 In a recent unilateral move, however, a new global 
telecom license (fixed, mobile and VSAT) has been granted to a new operator that started 
operations in April 2010.  
Tunisia started a process of negotiations for a services trade agreement with the EU in 
March 2006 in the Euro-Med context. Discussions on the general provisions of the 
agreements have started. These will be followed by bilateral negotiations on market 
access commitments. For Tunisia, mode 4 (temporary movement of professional services 
providers) and mode 2 in the area of health services represent two big areas of interest. 
These negotiations are crucial to secure better market access for its services providers to 
Europe, which would require a relaxing of restrictions in obtaining visas and mutual 
recognition agreements for diplomas and professional qualifications with some EU 
countries.  
To our knowledge, the only quantitative analysis of the impact of services trade 
liberalization for Tunisia is Konan and Maskus (2006). An earlier quantitative analysis of 
potential impacts of Tunisia-EU Association Agreement by Brown et al. (1997) did not 
include services sectors. Konan and Maskus used a computable general equilibrium 
model with multiple products, services and trading partners and found that reducing 
services barriers would generate relatively large welfare gains and low adjustment costs. 
However, their benchmark data and Social Accounting Matrix are dated 1995, which no 
longer reflect the current situation. Moreover, a strong assumption made in their paper is 
that barriers to foreign direct investment were half rent-creating and half cost-escalating. 
As is well-known, the results of reform simulations are very sensitive to those 
assumptions. In the current paper, the treatment of barriers is based on empirical 
evidence, where available, rather than assumption.   
The purpose of this paper is to: (i) benchmark Tunisia against other emerging economies 
in terms of the regulatory barriers affecting its services trade; (ii) assess the economy-
wide effects of further liberalizing services trade restrictions in particular sectors, either 
regionally or unilaterally; (iii) compare this with the effects of further liberalizing 
Tunisia’s agricultural and manufacturing trade in the context of its Association 
                                                 
1 Environment services relate to the management of solid waste, dangerous waste and sanitation. Foreign 
firms can enter the market but face a majority holding restriction (they can own up to 49 per cent of the 
capital) and they should agree to transfer technologies, recruit local staff and train staff locally. In the 
health sector, establishment is free without limit imposed on the capital for a list of medical fields where 
Tunisia has an export potential.    4
Agreement with the EU; and (iv) also contrast this with the effects of bringing its MFN 
tariff rates on manufacturing goods closer to EU preferential rates. These comparisons 
give important insights into Tunisia’s trade policy priorities over the next few years.  
2. Methodological approach to measuring services trade barriers  
Barriers in services trade vary by sector and a sector-by-sector analysis is needed to 
identify policy restrictions to entry and competition in services. The analytical framework 
that has been used to measure services trade barriers comprises three stages. 
The first stage is to collect qualitative information about regulatory restrictions affecting 
services delivery, and to convert it into a quantitative index (or indexes), using weights 
that reflect the relative severity of the different restrictions. Sometimes the weights are 
based on a priori judgements drawn from detailed knowledge of the industry concerned. 
Sometimes the weights are derived using statistical techniques, giving greatest weight to 
restrictions that have the greatest variability within the sample. Studies along these lines 
include the OECD studies of product market regulation (OECD 2005a, 2005b, Conway, 
Janod and Nicoletti 2005), Findlay and Warren (2000), Kalirajan (2000), Kalirajan et al. 
(2000), Nguyen-Hong (2000), Doove et al. (2001), Copenhagen Economics (2005) and 
OECD (2005c). 
Since services trade barriers typically operate behind the border, the second stage is to 
quantify the effects of these indexes of services trade barriers on some behind-the-border 
measure of economic performance — often prices or price-cost margins, but sometimes 
quantities or costs — while controlling for all the other factors that affect economic 
performance in that market. These econometric results are used to construct the 
counterfactual — what economic performance would be in the absence of the services 
trade restrictions, holding all other factors constant.  
This does not give a ‘tariff equivalent’, because the ‘tariff equivalent’ concept (a) 
assumes services are traded primarily cross-border, whereas most are traded behind the 
border via the movement of people or capital, and (b) assumes that domestic and foreign 
services are perfect substitutes, whereas most are highly differentiated to particular users. 
Instead, the counterfactual comparison gives a behind-the-border ‘tax equivalent’, if the 
restrictions have raised price-cost margins, or a behind-the-border ‘productivity 
equivalent’, if the restrictions have raised real resource costs. Econometric studies along 
these lines include Findlay and Warren (2000), Gonenc and Nicoletti (2000), Steiner 
(2000), Kalirajan (2000), Nguyen-Hong (2000), Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004), Clark, 
Dollar and Micco (2004) and OECD (2005c).  
In the third stage, the ‘tax equivalents’ or ‘productivity equivalents’ are entered into a 
computable general equilibrium model, which is then used to project the direct and 
indirect effects of services trade liberalization for each sector and for the economy as a 
whole. Examples include Dee and Hanslow (2001), Dee, Hanslow and Phamduc (2003), 
OECD (2004) and Copenhagen Economics (2005).   5
This study benchmarks Tunisia against a range of other emerging countries using index 
measures of services trade barriers derived from the first stage. The index measures are 
somewhat arbitrary — it is the econometrics in the second stage that establishes the true 
economic significance of the barriers. However, the index measures bear a monotonic 
relationship to the tax or productivity equivalent measures, and there are more of the 
former available than the latter. So for benchmarking purposes, the arbitrariness of the 
index measures is not a drawback.  
3. Benchmarking Tunisia on services restrictiveness 
This section benchmarks Tunisia against emerging and high-income countries for which 
restrictiveness indices, calculated consistently, exist. We consider seven key services 
sectors — postal services, telecommunications, air passenger transport, the accounting, 
legal and engineering professions, and banking. Tourism and maritime services sectors, 
two important sectors in Tunisia, are not covered because they are traditionally open to 
trade and investment with no significant barriers. One important sector not included is 
distribution. Entry into the distribution sector is strictly regulated and trading activities, 
including wholesale distribution and retail trading services, are reserved for enterprises in 
which Tunisians hold a majority interest. Table 1 shows the importance of the different 
services sectors in Tunisia’s economy (where the professional services are included in 
‘Other business services’ and banking is included in ‘Other financial services’).  
As noted, one rich source of index measures is the OECD studies of product market 
regulation (OECD 2005a, 2005b). Figures 1 to 6 show how Tunisia compares against the 
worst performing developed and emerging countries in the OECD sample in six key 
services sectors of interest. The scoring is based on answers to the questions shown in 
Tables 2-6. The OECD questionnaires collect and score information about a range of 
regulatory restrictions, but do not distinguish whether the restrictions only affect foreign 
operators, or also affect domestic players.    
Tunisia scores particularly poorly in postal services because it is one of the few countries 
in the world to retain restrictions on courier services — private operators are required to 
operate in partnership with Rapid Poste. Tunisia’s restrictions are second only to 
Turkey’s in telecommunications, largely because it still has a monopoly in fixed line 
telecommunications and a duopoly in mobile telephony. Its restrictions in air passenger 
transport are second only to Hungary, because Tunisia has not entered into an open skies 
agreement with the United States or regionally, because the rates are regulated for 
domestic aviation, and because the government still retains majority ownership in the 
largest carrier.   
Tunisia also scores relatively poorly in legal and accounting services. Here the OECD 
questionnaires are largely restricted to measures that are non-discriminatory — for 
example, exclusive licensing, and restrictions on fees, advertizing and the legal form of 
business. Tunisia’s range of regulations, particularly on fees, make it second only to 
Turkey and Italy in restricting competition in accounting, and second only to Greece and 
Turkey in restricting competition in law. What the OECD index fails to indicate is the 
strength of Tunisia’s discriminatory restrictions in these professions — foreign firms   6
cannot practice law, but can only provide legal consulting services, and accounting firms 
must be 100 percent locally owned.  
Only in engineering services does Tunisia receive a relatively liberal score. Tunisia has 
been trying to encourage FDI, and accordingly provides a relatively unrestrictive 
regulatory regime for both the domestic and foreign engineers required for large projects.  
The index measures of regulatory restrictions in banking services originate from one of a 
series of studies carried out by the Australian Productivity Commission (McGuire and 
Schuele 2000). Figure 7 shows how Tunisia compares against the worst performing 
developed and developing countries for which recent banking estimates are available. 
The scoring is based on the template shown in Table 7. 
These index measures in banking explicitly distinguish between regulations that affect 
only foreign banks (the foreign index), and those that affect domestic and foreign banks 
equally (the domestic index). Thus the difference between the domestic and foreign index 
measures the pure margin of discrimination against foreign banks.   
Tunisia’s banking restrictions against foreign banks are not as severe as those in 
Malaysia, China, Vietnam and Brazil. But they are marginally worse than those in 
Morocco, and significantly worse than those in South Eastern Europe. Tunisia’s score 
reflects in part the restrictions on both lending and raising funds that are faced by foreign 
banks. Tunisia also maintains non-discriminatory restrictions, including the authorization 
process that is required of both domestic and foreign banks. 
4. Reform options 
Reform strategies 
It appears that the regulatory restrictions affecting Tunisia’s services sector are generally 
relatively severe, compared with those in comparable emerging economies. Liberalizing 
these restrictions could help to harness the export potential of its emerging services, such 
as ICT-enabled services and the professions, allowing Tunisia to be better positioned as a 
location for the outsourcing of the back-office functions of European companies. Greater 
use of business-to-business (B2B) ecommerce within Tunisia could also improve the 
competitiveness of Tunisia’s own manufacturing and services sectors. Finally, 
liberalizing the restrictions in key backbone services such as banking, 
telecommunications and air passenger transport could boost competition and investment 
in these sectors, for further gains to the economy as a whole. 
Given Tunisia’s relatively uncompetitive position in services relative to other emerging 
economies, there is little reason for Tunisia to wait for other countries to reciprocate in 
liberalizing their services. France, its key client economy within Europe, is already 
significantly more liberal than Tunisia. And Tunisia lags behind many of the emerging 
countries that would compete with it for outsourced services. For the professions, 
banking and telecommunications, it would make sense for Tunisia to liberalize 
unilaterally, although there is also scope for reform on a bilateral basis in the professions.    7
Air passenger transport is another matter. International air flights require international 
cooperation to provide the necessary infrastructure and air traffic rights. If Tunisia were 
to liberalize, while its partners continued to restrict entry, capacity and air fares, this 
could lead to adverse outcomes for Tunisia’s aviation industry, without providing 
benefits to its consumers. A more sensible first step would be a bilateral ‘open skies’ 
agreement with the European Union. This would not provide the maximum opportunity 
for Tunisia to optimize its own international air services network, and hence achieve the 
full cost savings available from reaping network economies. This would likely require 
open skies agreements with Tunisia’s Arab League partners as well. However, an open 
skies agreement with the European Union would open those bilateral routes up to low-
cost carriers, putting competitive pressure on air fares on those routes.  
First-round impacts on sector prices 
In telecommunications, Tunisia could lift the numerical restrictions on the number of 
carriers in both fixed and mobile telephony, to increase the general contestability of the 
market. It could also lift the foreign ownership limits on competitive carriers, to attract 
further foreign direct investment. This would likely have two types of effects.  
First, the greater market contestability and foreign competition would squeeze price-cost 
margins within telecommunications. This effect has been quantified in second-stage 
econometric work by Warren (2000), as summarized in Dee (2005). The top portion of 
Table 8 shows that Tunisia’s general restrictions on competition could currently be 
inflating the prices of domestically owned telecommunications services by 6.8 percent, 
while the additional restrictions on foreign ownership mean that the prices from foreign 
suppliers could be inflated by 15.5 percent. Were Tunisia to remove these restrictions, 
price-cost margins would be squeezed, and prices would be lower accordingly (middle 
portion of table 8).  
In banking, Tunisia could remove the discretion associated with the granting of new bank 
licenses (domestic and foreign). It could also lift the restrictions faced by foreign banks in 
lending and raising funds domestically. These moves would squeeze price-cost margins 
in banking, an effect that has been quantified in second stage econometrics by Kalirajan 
et al. (2000), as summarized in Dee (2005). The results suggest that the removal of 
authorization could reduce the price impact of services trade restrictions on domestic 
banks from an estimated 7.5 percent to 4.9 percent (table 8). This, together with the 
removal of the restrictions on foreign bank lending and raising funds, could reduce the 
price impact of services trade restrictions on foreign banks from 17.5 percent to 6.8 
percent (table 8). 
In the professions, Tunisia could unilaterally get rid of the nationality requirement 
affecting law, accounting and engineering. The corresponding requirement in law and 
accounting for partners to be local could also be relaxed, with partners only required to be 
locally licensed. This reform would reduce the price impact of services trade restrictions 
from an estimated 19.1 percent to 11.9 percent for foreign services suppliers. And this 
would affect not just those wanting to establish a permanent commercial presence in 
Tunisia, but also those wanting to supply these services via ecommerce or via the   8
temporary movement of individual professionals (table 8, first and second columns, 
based on econometric work by Nguyen-Hong 2000).  
A further potential reform would be for Tunisia to seek bilateral concessions in the 
context of its Association Agreement with the EU, in order to facilitate the outsourcing of 
back-office accounting and legal services to Tunisia, especially from France. 
Accordingly, Tunisia could allow up to 50 percent EU ownership of local accounting or 
law firms, to allow those companies some management control over the local firms 
undertaking the outsourcing activities. And it could seek a mutual recognition agreement 
with France, allowing French recognition of local Tunisian professional qualifications for 
the purposes of undertaking the back office activities, in exchange for the recognition of 
French qualifications in Tunisia. This latter move could further reduce the price impact of 
remaining restrictions on the supply of foreign professional services in Tunisia to 6.4 
percent (bottom portion of table 8), with a corresponding improvement in the 
competitiveness of Tunisian suppliers into the EU market.  
It is assumed here that in return for these unilateral and bilateral reforms, the EU would 
agree to remove its discriminatory restrictions on a preferential basis — not just granting 
Tunisian professionals mutual recognition, but also relaxing the investment restrictions, 
nationality requirements, hiring and other restrictions that apply in at least some 
professions, as they affect Tunisian suppliers. This would reduce the average price impact 
of remaining restrictions on the supply of Tunisia professional services into Europe from 
9.5 percent to an estimated 5 percent (not shown in table 8).   
Finally, the econometric work on which these estimates are based suggests that the 
unilateral and bilateral reductions in discrimination against foreign professionals would 
reduce prices by reducing price-cost margins. This is in contrast with the removal of non-
discriminatory restrictions on both domestic and foreign professionals, which could 
reduce prices by reducing real resource costs.  
As noted, in air passenger transport, Tunisia could seek an open skies agreement with 
the EU. The likely effects of this have been quantified in second-stage econometric work 
by Gonenc and Nicoletti (2000) and Doove et al. (2001). For the purposes of this paper, 
that work has been updated using more recent information about the content of air 
services agreements from ICAO (2004). The price impact of Tunisia’s current air 
services agreements with the EU has been quantified at 15.4 percent. This would drop to 
zero in a bilateral basis under an open skies agreement (table 9). As noted above, this 
price reduction is likely to come about through a reduction in price-costs margins rather 
than through a reduction in resource costs. Cost savings from achieving greater network 
economies would probably require a more extensive series of open skies agreements.  
Furthermore, it is assumed that the open skies agreement extends to freight as well as 
passenger traffic. A freight agreement is likely to be less contentious, and could achieve 
similar benefits. Accordingly, the above estimated reduction in price-cost margins is 
applied to exports of the entire air transport industry, covering both freight and 
passengers.    9
5. The economy-wide effects of services trade liberalization in Tunisia 
Modeling framework 
The effects of these reform initiatives have been projected using the FTAP model of the 
world economy, which was developed by Dee and Hanslow (2001), is documented fully 
in Hanslow, Phamduc and Verikios (1999), and is available for download at 
http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au/staff/pdee.php. The FTAP model is a computable 
general equilibrium model incorporating services delivered via FDI. It differs in turn 
from GTAP (Hertel 1997), the ‘plain vanilla’ model from which it was derived, in three 
important respects.  
First, because many services are delivered primarily via commercial presence, the 
modelling framework includes foreign direct investment as a mode of services trade 
delivery, and covers separately the production and trading activity of foreign 
multinationals. In other words, GTAP, the conventional multi-country model, is split out 
by ownership as well as location. In the current version of FTAP, the foreign ownership 
shares for Tunisia were obtained from survey data provided by Tunisia’s Institut National 
de la Statisique (INS). The relative size of the Tunisian communications industry was 
also adjusted upwards, compared with that in the original GTAP database (version 6), 
based on value added shares provided by INS.  
Second, by virtue of foreign ownership, at least some of the profits of foreign 
multinationals will be repatriated back to the home countries. Thus the profit streams in 
the conventional multi-country model have to be reallocated from the host to the home 
country, after provision is made for them to be taxed in either the home or host country. 
This reallocation leads to a distinction between GDP — the income generated in a region 
— and GNP — the income received by residents of a region. The latter forms the basis of 
(although is not identical to) the welfare measure in FTAP. The information on profit 
repatriation comes from the Balance of Payments Statistics of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).  
Finally, not all profits of foreign multinationals need be repatriated to the home country. 
Some may be reinvested in the host country. To account for this phenomenon, and to 
allow for the effect that regulatory reform may have on both domestic and foreign direct 
investment more generally, the model makes provision for savings and capital 
accumulation. This is particularly important, since some regulatory barriers are aimed 
directly at limiting foreign equity participation. It is therefore important to capture how 
regulatory reform will affect not just foreign ownership shares, but also the total amount 
of productivity capacity available to an economy. National savings rates are derived from 
the macroeconomic data in the International Financial Statistics and Balance of Payments 
Statistics of the IMF. Government savings rates are derived from the Government 
Finance Statistics of the IMF. Household savings rates are calculated as a residual.  
The FTAP model also differs from GTAP in other respects. In particular, it allows for 
firm-level product differentiation, economies of scale and large-group monopolistic 
competition. This is also important, since services tend to be highly specialized, being   10
tailored to the needs of individual customers. In the current version, economies of scale 
are assumed to be regional for services, and global for all other sectors (Dee 2003). 
The version used here contains four regions — Tunisia, the EU, the GAFTA countries, 
and the rest of the world. It contains 30 sectors, including 11 in the services sector (table 
10). Note that tourism is included in the model as a sales activity rather than a separate 
productive industry. This means that sales to foreign tourists are recorded among the 
exports of the industries producing goods that foreign tourists buy (air passenger 
transport, and so on), while sales to domestic tourists are recorded among the sales to 
household consumption of those industries.  
The model provides a long-run snapshot of how different each economy would look 
about ten years after the introduction of the reforms, compared to the situation at that 
same point in time if the reforms had not taken place. During the ten year adjustment 
period, many other changes would affect each economy, but they are not taken into 
account in the current analysis. For this reason, the results should not be interpreted as 
indicating the likely changes that would occur over time in each economy — this would 
require all changes, not just those in regulatory trade barriers, to be taken into account. 
The distinction is important to keep in mind. Sometimes, to aid fluency, the results are 
couched as if key indicators ‘rise’ or ‘fall’. This does not mean that the indicators would 
be higher or lower than they are now. It means that at some future time, they would be 
higher or lower than they would be otherwise. In both cases, in a growing economy, they 
could be higher than they are now.   
Results 
The effects of the above Tunisian services trade liberalization scenarios on economic 
well-being in each region are shown in table 11. The effects on Tunisia are not large — 
gains in economic well-being of around US $77 million per year after ten years (in an 
economy with GDP of about US $20 billion per year in the model’s initial database, 
which is mostly calibrated to 2001). The economy is also projected to be slightly larger, 
with real GDP being 0.29 percent larger than otherwise.  
These projected macroeconomic effects are driven by the changes to consumer prices 
(from domestic and import sources), producer prices (of both Tunisian-owned and EU-
owned firms), and real resource costs (for both Tunisian-owned and EU-owned firms) 
that are shown in table 12. This pattern of projected price changes largely reflects the 
pattern of first-round effects shown in tables 8 and 9. 
The reason that the welfare gains are small is that most of the reforms are targeted at 
restrictions that have inflated price-cost margins, rather than real resource costs. The 
distinction is crucial for economic well-being. The prices of services have been inflated, 
not because the real resource cost of producing them has been inflated, but because 
incumbent firms have been able to earn economic rents — akin to a tax, but with the 
revenue flowing to the incumbents rather than to government. Liberalization of these 
barriers yields ‘triangle gains’ in producer and consumer surplus associated with   11
improvements in allocative efficiency, but also has redistributive effects associated with 
the elimination of rents to incumbents. The net result is a large transfer from incumbent 
producers to consumers and other using industries, and a relatively small gain to the 
economy as a whole.  
This is in contrast to the situation when services trade restrictions increase the real 
resource cost of doing business. Liberalization is then equivalent to a productivity 
improvement (saving in real resources), and yields ‘roughly rectangle’ gains associated 
with a downward shift in supply curves. This can increase returns for the incumbent 
service providers, as well as lowering costs for users elsewhere in the economy. The net 
result is a relatively large gain to the economy as a whole. 
Whether barriers create rents or add to resource costs is under-researched currently. In 
some cases, the empirical evidence from the second stage econometrics is suggestive, but 
not conclusive. In other cases, a price impact is estimated, and then it is simply asserted 
whether the effect operates through price-cost margins or through real resource costs. For 
example, it was simply assumed in the Konan and Maskus (2006) study of Tunisia that 
barriers were half rent-creating and half cost-escalating.  
However, theory can provide some guidance. Rents are likely to be created by 
quantitative and other barriers that limit entry (or exit, though this is far less common). 
Some red-tape measures may add to resource costs. There are also many ways in which 
rents can be dissipated or capitalized. So, regulatory barriers that may once have been 
rent-creating for the initial incumbent can become cost-escalating for subsequent 
incumbents. For example, Kalirajan (2000) provides indirect evidence that some of the 
zoning and other restrictions common in the wholesale and retail sector create rents that 
are subsequently capitalized into the price of commercial land. 
The limited empirical evidence tends to accord with this intuition. In banking and 
telecommunications, where explicit barriers to entry are rife, barriers appear to create 
rents. In distribution services, where indirect trade restrictions also apply, barriers appear 
to increase costs. In air passenger transport and the professions, barriers can potentially 
have both effects (Gregan and Johnson 1999, Kalirajan et al. 2000, Kalirajan 2000, 
Nguyen-Hong 2000, OECD 2005c, Copenhagen Economics 2005). And theoretical 
arguments suggest that barriers in maritime and electricity generation primarily affect 
costs (Steiner 2000, Clark, Dollar and Micco 2004). 
The above reform scenarios were concentrated in sectors where barriers appear to create 
rents. In addition, the reform measures were largely aimed at removing discrimination 
against foreign suppliers. This is no coincidence. When regulatory restrictions are 
targeted only at foreign suppliers, they tend to be explicit quantity controls, since this is 
the most feasible way of imposing discrimination.  
The welfare gains modeled here are significantly smaller than those in the Konan and 
Maskus (2006) study of the impact of services liberalization in Tunisia. As noted, those 
authors simply assumed that barriers to foreign direct investment were half rent-creating 
and half cost-escalating. On the basis of this assumption, their projected gains in   12
economic well-being from services trade liberalization were about 4 percent. By contrast, 
when they assumed the barriers to be entirely rent-creating, their projected gains in 
economic well-being fell to 0.33 percent, close to that projected here (see their table 4). 
In the current study, the treatment of barriers is based on available empirical evidence, 
where available, rather than assumption. 
Another reason for the gains in the Konan and Maskus (2006) to be slightly bigger is that 
they implicitly assumed that the services of domestic and foreign-owned firms in Tunisia 
were perfect substitutes (they did not explicitly identify the proportion of each industry 
that was foreign-owned, but assumed that the reduction in barriers to foreign investment 
would affect the prices of all firms in Tunisia, not just the foreign-owned firms). By 
contrast, the FTAP model assumes that the services of domestic and foreign-owned firms 
are close but imperfect substitutes. This also reduces the gains from reform slightly, but 
this is of second order importance, compared to the different treatment of the barriers 
themselves (as the Konan and Maskus sensitivity analysis shows).   
If Tunisia were to also contemplate domestic regulatory reform initiatives aimed at the 
non-discriminatory restrictions in sectors such as ports, electricity generation and 
wholesale and retail trade, where the empirical evidence suggests that restrictions raise 
real resource costs, this could provide much larger gains to the economy as a whole.  
This can be demonstrated in a small way by considering the gains to the Tunisian 
economy from full rather than partial reform in the four chosen sectors. Here, full reform 
is defined to mean that all the discriminatory and non-discriminatory restrictions in 
telecommunications, banking and professional services are eliminated entirely, while air 
passenger transport is liberalized on a bilateral basis with the EU. So importantly, full 
reform would include reform of the non-discriminatory restrictions in the professions that 
appear to raise real resource costs (see the last column of table 8). The welfare gains to 
the Tunisian economy from full reform are projected to be US $175 million per year after 
ten years (last row of table 11), compared to US $77 million per year from partial reform. 
And fully 80 percent of the difference is accounted for by lower resource costs in the 
professions.  
The point is also demonstrated by studies that have looked at the impact of more 
widespread reforms in services, including reform of the non-discriminatory restrictions in 
wholesale and retail trade, electricity generation and ports, where costs have been raised. 
These studies suggest that reform of the non-discriminatory restrictions can yield 
between 75 and 90 percent of the total gains from reform (eg OECD 2004). These results 
suggest that if Tunisia were to contemplate broader domestic regulatory reform initiatives 
aimed at non-discriminatory restrictions in these other sectors, the gains could be several 
orders of magnitude greater than those projected here.   
There are still some useful insights from the narrower set of reforms. Because the 
Tunisian reforms are mostly behind the border (with the main exception of the open skies 
agreement in air passenger transport, which is in any event bilateral), the gains to other 
regions from so-called ‘free-riding’ are minimal. This has been observed in other studies 
of services trade reform. In the current case, the EU is in fact projected to lose slightly in   13
welfare terms from unilateral reform of Tunisia’s telecommunications and banking 
sectors. The EU is an important source of Tunisia’s foreign investment in these sectors, 
so is adversely affected to a small degree by the loss of rents of its foreign multinationals 
in Tunisia. In other studies, trading partner countries can be slightly adversely affected by 
unilateral reforms, especially those that reduce costs in the reforming country. This is 
because such reforms improve the international competitiveness of the reforming 
country, so partners suffer a small terms of trade loss.  
But reversing the argument, it means that Tunisia also has little to gain from behind-the-
border reform in other countries. This is an additional reason why Tunisia should not wait 
for services trade reform initiatives to be reciprocated, except in sectors like air passenger 
transport where unilateral action would clearly be unwise.  
The reforms also have implications for the ownership structure of Tunisian industries. 
Surprisingly, even though many of the reforms remove discrimination against foreign 
suppliers, the projections do not suggest that domestically-owned services suppliers 
would be significantly smaller than otherwise (table 13). Only in the professions (the 
model’s ‘Other business services’ sector) are domestically owned firms projected to be 
smaller than otherwise — by less than 1 percent, a result that could be easily absorbed by 
normal economic growth. In banking (the model’s ‘Other financial services’ sector) and 
communications, the domestically owned firms are projected to benefit from the removal 
of some of the discrimination against foreign firms.  
One important reason for this is that domestically owned and foreign firms in these 
sectors have been modeled as providing closely, but not perfectly, substitutable services. 
In many services sectors, local firms in fact have local advantages that allow them to 
thrive alongside foreign providers.  
Another reason is that, as in most other countries, the most intensive users of services are 
other services sectors, not agriculture or manufacturing. For example, there are typically 
more telephones in office buildings than in factories. So the sectors to benefit most from 
services sector reform are the services sectors themselves — not just banking and 
telecommunications, but also construction, trade and insurance. Most sectors in 
agriculture and manufacturing are projected to be slightly smaller than otherwise as a 
result of the services sector reforms. This is because there is assumed to be the same 
amount of skilled and unskilled labor available to the economy, whether or not the 
reforms take place. So if the reforms encourage some sectors to be larger than otherwise, 
then at least some other sectors need to be smaller than otherwise. But overall, the 
services sector reforms are good for the Tunisian labor market — real wages are 
projected to be 1.4 percent higher than otherwise as a result of the reforms.   
Table 14 confirms a significant boost in exports from the services sectors undergoing 
reform — by about 30 percent in air passenger transport (including increased exports to 
foreign tourists), 50-70 percent in communications, 10-20 percent in banking and 30-50 
percent in professional services. Again, the export performance comes not just from the 
foreign-owned services suppliers in these industries, but also from Tunisian-owned firms, 
and contributes to a 0.9 percent increase in total export volumes. The services exports   14
shown in table 14 are those recorded in traditional balance of payments statistics — 
predominantly exports delivered via cross-border trade and consumption abroad (eg sales 
of services to foreign tourists). The growth in the output of foreign-owned firms in 
Tunisia (table 13), and the corresponding increases in their sales to other firms in Tunisia, 
represents an increase in Tunisian imports of services delivered via commercial presence. 
But table 14 confirms that those same foreign-owned firms contribute significantly to 
increases in services exports delivered via other modes.    
In summary, the services sector reforms examined here could provide small but useful 
benefits to the Tunisian economy. The economy is projected to be slightly bigger than 
otherwise, slightly more services intensive than otherwise, with a slightly bigger 
proportion of foreign ownership than otherwise, and with a greater export intensity than 
otherwise (table 15), providing a projected slight improvement in economic well-being.  
Note that the representation of the Tunisian economy in the benchmark equilibrium in 
table 15 is after the injection into the FTAP model’s database of the estimated initial 
barriers to services trade in each region (carried out using the GTAP model’s ‘altertax’ 
procedure adapted to the FTAP model — see Malcolm 1998 for details), and after an 
increase in the relative size of the Tunisian communications industry, to better match 
national data (carried out via a taste shift in favour of communications). The benchmark 
equilibrium matches neither national data nor the GTAP model database exactly.  
A further policy question is how the benefits from services sector reforms would compare 
to those from further reform of agriculture and manufacturing. This is the topic of the 
next section.  
6. The economy-wide effects of further liberalizing agriculture and manufacturing  
In 2005, the tariff assistance provided to Tunisia’s agricultural and manufacturing sectors 
was both high and variable. Detailed data for 2005 (summarized in WTO 2005) show that 
tariffs on agricultural products were in the 20-90 percent range, while MFN tariffs on 
manufactures were mostly 20-30 percent (table 16). Thus the protection in agriculture 
was much higher than in manufacturing. Both were higher than the tax equivalents of the 
regulatory restrictions in the particular services sectors considered above. However, they 
would not necessarily be of less economic significance than cost-raising restrictions 
elsewhere in services.  
Tunisia has been in the process of phasing out its tariffs on manufactured imports from 
the EU, so that in 2005 tariffs on manufactures from this source were less than 10 percent 
(table 16). This is an additional source of variability in Tunisia’s protection structure. 
Once account is taken of tariff rate quotas and the ad-valorem equivalent of specific 
tariffs, Tunisia’s protection structure may be even more variable. Such protection 
estimates are available from the GTAP model database for the year 2001, and are shown 
in table 17. The estimates for manufactures from this source are very roughly the same as 
those for 2005 from the WTO (note that the GTAP version 6 database incorporates trade-
weighted applied preferential tariff rates). The estimates for agriculture are more variable   15
than from the WTO, reflecting in part the incidence of tariff rate quotas and specific 
tariffs in this sector.  
Tunisia has also signed a trade agreement with GAFTA countries, and has been reducing 
its formal tariffs from this source. But reports are that any reduction in tariffs on imports 
from GAFTA has been countered by an increase in administrative barriers, with no real 
increase in market access. So the extent of true protection from GAFTA imports now is 
probably the same as that shown in table 17 for 2001. It generally lies somewhere 
between that for the EU and that for other countries.  
The policy dilemma facing Tunisia is that the further reductions in its tariffs on imports 
from EU, while reducing the average level of protection, may greatly increase the 
dispersion in protection — both the dispersion between agriculture and manufacturing, 
and the dispersion between different country sources of manufactured goods. Since the 
welfare damage done by import protection comes from the dispersion and well as the 
average level, Tunisia’s current policy course may not yield benefits unless the question 
of dispersion is also addressed.  
The extent of this policy dilemma is now examined empirically. For this purpose, the 
structure of protection from the GTAP version 6 database is used, since although it 
slightly overstates the current tariffs on manufactures from the EU, it picks up the 
incidence of tariff rate quotas and specific tariffs in agriculture, as well as the likely real 
structure of protection against imports from GAFTA countries.  
Reform scenarios 
One way that Tunisia could address the issue of dispersion in protection is by including 
agriculture in its bilateral reductions in protection with the EU — currently agriculture is 
largely omitted by both sides. This forms the basis of one reform scenario — Tunisia 
eliminates its border protection (import barriers and export subsidies) on agricultural 
goods from the EU, and the EU reciprocates.  
Tunisian agricultural producers could have difficulty taking full advantage of this market 
access, without improvements in the quality of the exportables they produce. 
‘The cases of citrus and olive oil illustrate how potential is not being realized. The 
key issue is quality. Supply chains must be responsive to consumers’ specific 
demands. But to get premium oranges and oil onto the market, farmers need first-
rate technical and marketing support from research, extension and producers’ 
organizations. And Government interventions, in the form of fixed retail margins 
and the Office des Huiles’ control over quotas and testing, are interposed between 
the producer and consumer. The result is that Tunisian oranges and olive oil 
command low prices and EU quota is left unused. Conversely, when Government 
has made partial reforms, such as the removal of the ONH’s olive oil export 
monopoly, the private sector has responded.’ (World Bank 2006, pp. 6–7)   16
Improving the quality of agricultural exportables would require not just technical 
solutions (research, extension) but also domestic regulatory reforms to remove 
government controls over quality control and wholesale and retail distribution networks, 
allowing Tunisian producers’ direct access to their customers in Europe. The benefits of a 
10 percent productivity improvement in Tunisia’s agricultural exportables (Fruit and 
vegetables, Oil seeds and fats, Other agricultural products) is also examined here, 
although the broader benefits of reform in wholesale and retail distribution, which could 
help bring it about, are not included.  
Another way in which Tunisia could address the issue of dispersion in protection is by 
accompanying the elimination of the remaining tariffs on manufactures from Europe with 
a concomitant reduction in applied tariffs on imports from other sources. Tariffs on 
imports from the EU have been eliminated in recent years — Tunisia could also consider 
reducing its tariffs on imports from all other sources by 25 percent.  
Results 
The effects of these reform scenarios in Tunisian agriculture and manufacturing are 
shown in table 18. As expected, the results confirm that there are significant gains from 
reforming border protection in Tunisian agriculture. Current protection levels are so high 
that any form of liberalization yields gains, even if it is on a preferential basis with the 
EU. This alone is projected to improve economic well-being in Tunisia by US $114 
million per year after about ten years.  
Unlike in services, there are also significant gains in other countries reciprocating. 
Tunisia would gain US $295 million per year after about ten years if the EU were to drop 
its border protection (import tariffs and quotas and export subsidies) against Tunisian 
agriculture. Productivity improvements in Tunisian agriculture are probably a 
precondition for these gains to be realized. But a 10 percent productivity improvement in 
agricultural exportables would by itself provide US $258 million per year in gains. The 
combined package of agricultural reforms would provide total gains of US $733 million 
per year after about then years (equivalent to almost 4 percent of GDP). Real GDP itself 
would be 4.6 percent higher than otherwise. 
The results confirm, however, that manufacturing tariffs against EU imports in 2005 were 
sufficiently low, relative to protection elsewhere, that the welfare cost of exacerbating the 
dispersion in protection would dominate — phasing out the remaining tariffs against EU 
manufactures would mean economic well-being was US $184 million per year lower than 
otherwise, after about ten years. This adverse effect could be partially offset by reducing 
tariffs on imports from all other sources by 25 percent. By itself, this would provide gains 
of US $74 million per year. The combined package of reforms to manufacturing tariffs 
would yield a net loss of US $104 million per year.  
But the structure of protection in Tunisia in 2005 was so variable that perhaps the only 
strategy in manufacturing to guarantee an overall net gain would be an across-the-board-
approach — full liberalization of protection on imports from all sources, both EU and   17
otherwise. In the bottom line of table 18, this is shown to produce net gains of US $65 
million per year, after about ten years. 
So it appears that on the basis of a rather restricted sample of services sectors, partial 
regulatory reform in those sectors would yield gains roughly equivalent to full unilateral 
reform of manufacturing tariffs, but roughly one tenth the gains from full bilateral reform 
of border protection in agriculture with the EU.  
Unlike in services, however, the gains in agriculture and manufacturing tend to come at 
the expense of domestic output in the reforming sectors — the gains are greater, but so 
too are the adjustment costs.  
In agriculture, the biggest loser in output terms would be Tunisia’s highly protected 
cereals industry, which is projected to be about 40 percent smaller than otherwise after 
about ten years as a result of the agricultural reforms. This would be consistent with the 
economy as a whole growing by 5 percent a year over that period, but the cereals industry 
remaining stagnant. Thus if the agricultural reforms took place in an environment where 
general economic growth was greater than 5 percent a year, the cereals industry might 
have to contract in relative terms in response to the reforms, but it would not have to 
contract in absolute terms. 
The adjustment pressures would not be as great in manufacturing as in agriculture, 
because the initial levels of assistance are not as great. The worst affected sectors — 
wood and paper products, metals and products, and transport equipment — would be 
smaller than otherwise by 10 percent or less after about ten years as a result of 
eliminating the remaining tariffs on EU imports and cutting tariffs on imports from other 
sources by 25 percent. Adjustment of this magnitude could be absorbed with underlying 
economic growth rates of just 1 percent a year.  
In summary, the protection afforded Tunisia’s agricultural and manufacturing sectors is 
both high and variable. Expanding the scope of bilateral liberalization with the EU to 
include agricultural products would yield significant gains to Tunisia. In manufacturing, 
there is now an urgent need to address the increasing dispersion of assistance created by 
the gap between tariffs on imports from the EU and imports from other sources. 
Accompanying the elimination of the remaining tariffs on EU products with a reduction 
in tariff rates from other sources appears to be a precondition for further economic gains. 
These expanded reforms in agriculture and manufacturing will create adjustment 
pressures, but especially in manufacturing, they are of a scope to be easily absorbed with 
normal rates of underlying economic growth.  
7. Concluding comments  
This paper has examined the possible effects of services trade initiatives that could 
improve Tunisia’s competitiveness relative to comparable emerging economies, 
particularly in European markets. Tunisia’s ongoing discussions with the EU in a Euro-
Med context could provide a possible forum for these next steps. The paper considers 
seven key services sectors — postal services, telecommunications, air passenger   18
transport, the accounting, legal and engineering professions, and banking. Tourism and 
maritime services, which are important to the Tunisian economy, are not covered because 
they are traditionally open to trade and investment with no significant barriers.   
The possible first-round impacts of services trade initiatives in these sectors have been 
determined using econometric work that has quantified the effects of regulatory 
restrictions on economic performance in the sectors, while controlling for all other factors 
that affect that economic performance. The economy-wide effects of the services trade 
initiatives have then been projected using a computable general equilibrium model that 
includes foreign direct investment as an important mode of services trade delivery, and 
covers separately the production and trading activity of foreign multinationals. 
On the basis of this restricted sample of services sectors, partial regulatory reform would 
yield gains roughly equivalent to full unilateral reform of manufacturing tariffs, but 
roughly one tenth the gains from full bilateral reform in border protection in agriculture 
with the EU. The adjustment costs associated with these services trade reforms are 
minimal. Even though many of the reforms remove discrimination against foreign 
suppliers, the projections do not suggest that domestically-owned services suppliers 
would be significantly smaller than otherwise. In many services sectors, local firms in 
fact have local and/or niche market advantages that allow them to thrive alongside 
foreign providers. The model makes provision for this differentiation. 
One reason that the projected gains from services trade reform are relatively small is that 
most of the reforms are targeted at restrictions that have inflated price-cost margins rather 
than real resource costs. Liberalization therefore induces a relatively large transfer from 
incumbent producers to consumers, and a relatively small net gain to the economy as a 
whole. Nevertheless, whether barriers create rents or add to resource costs is under-
researched currently. In the past, the issue has tended to be resolved by assertion, and 
sensitivity analysis has merely confirmed the importance of the assertion. Ideally, the 
econometric work that quantifies the first-round effects of regulatory restrictions should 
use a sufficiently rich set of performance measures to shed empirical light on the issue 
(Dee 2005).  
Another reason that the projected gains from services trade reform are relatively small is 
that, as noted, the services trade reforms are largely aimed at removing discrimination 
against foreign suppliers. Dee (2007) provides a number of reasons why in practice, 
formal services trade negotiations tend to focus on this dimension of liberalization. But 
those regulatory restrictions that are targeted only at foreign suppliers tend to be explicit 
quantity controls, since this is the most feasible way of imposing discrimination. Quantity 
controls in turn are the restrictions most likely to inflate price-cost margins rather than 
raise real resource costs.     
Studies that have looked at the impact of more widespread reforms in services, including 
reform of non-discriminatory restrictions that tend to raise real resource costs, suggest 
that these can yield more than three-quarters of the overall gain from services trade 
reform. If Tunisia were to contemplate wider reforms, including in areas such as 
wholesale and retail trade, electricity generation and ports, the gains could be several   19
orders of magnitude greater than those projected here. To the extent that the wider 
reforms targeted non-discriminatory restrictions, they could further benefit locally-owned 
new entrants. To the extent that they targeted restrictions at raised real resource costs, 
they could even benefit incumbent suppliers. A wider set of reforms could therefore 
provide win-win outcomes and even fewer adjustment problems than projected here.  
Relative to the selected services trade reforms considered here, reducing the dispersion in 
Tunisia’s barriers to its merchandise trade would yield at least as big a gain. This could 
be achieved, either by including agriculture in the bilateral liberalization occurring with 
the EU, or by accompanying the current elimination of tariffs against EU manufactures 
with a reduction in tariffs against imports from other sources. Unlike in services, 
however, the gains in agriculture and manufacturing would tend to come at the expense 
of domestic output in the reforming sectors — the gains are greater, but so too are the 
adjustment costs.   
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Data source: Based on OECD (2005b). 
 
   24
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Figure 3  OECD index of regulatory restrictions in air passenger transport 


















Data source: Based on OECD (2005b). 
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Data source: Based on OECD (2005a). 
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Data source: Based on OECD (2005a). 
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Data source: Based on OECD (2005a). 
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Figure 7  Productivity Commission index of regulatory restrictions in banking 
services 
























Data source: Based on Dee (2005) and McGuire and Schuele (2000).   30
Table 1  Sectoral value added in Tunisia 
Millions of US dollars Percentage of total
Agriculture, other primary and food  3281 20.1
Other manufacturing  2111 12.9
Electricity  344 2.1
Gas and water  126 0.8
Construction  975 6.0
Trade  2744 16.8
Other transport  1194 7.3
Air transport  382 2.3
Communications  778 4.8
Other financial services   557 3.4
Insurance  67 0.4
Other business services  680 4.2
Other services  3098 19.0
Total  16336 100.0
Source: FTAP model database, based on the GTAP version 6 database (Hertel 1997).  
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Table 2  OECD regulatory questionnaire for postal services 
Weights 
by theme  
Question 
weights Score  Question 
      
1/2     Entry regulation 
      
 1/3  
Do national, state or provincial laws or other regulations restrict 
the number of competitors allowed to operate a business in at 
least some markets in the sector: national post — basic letter 
services? 
    6  Yes, in all markets 
    3  Yes, in some markets 
    0  No, free entry in all markets 
     
 1/3  
Do national, state or provincial laws or other regulations restrict 
the number of competitors allowed to operate a business in at 
least some markets in the sector: national post — basic parcel 
services? 
    6  Yes, in all markets 
    3  Yes, in some markets 
    0  No, free entry in all markets 
     
 1/3  
Do national, state or provincial laws or other regulations restrict 
the number of competitors allowed to operate a business in at 
least some markets in the sector: courier activities other than 
national post? 
   6  Yes 
   0  No 
     
1/2     Public ownership
     
 1/3  
What percentage of shares in the largest firm in the sector: 
national post — basic letter services are owned by the 
government? 
   6  100% 
    3  Between 0 and 100% 
   0  None 
     
 1/3  
What percentage of shares in the largest firm in the sector: 
national post — basic parcel services are owned by the 
government? 
   6  100% 
    3  Between 0 and 100% 
   0  None 
     
 1/3  
What is the extent of public ownership in the courier activities 
(other than national post) sector? 
    6  Govt controls all dominant firms in the sector 
    3  Govt controls at least 1 firm, but other firms operate as well 
    0  No govt involvement in the sector 
     
Source: OECD (2005b). 
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Table 3  OECD regulatory questionnaire for telecommunications services 
Weights 
by theme  
Question 
weights
a Score  Question 
      
1/3     Entry regulation 




What are the legal conditions of entry into the trunk telephony 
market? 
    6  Franchised to 1 firm  
    3  Franchised to 2 or more firms  
  0  Free  entry 






What are the legal conditions of entry into the international 
market? 
    6  Franchised to 1 firm  
    3  Franchised to 2 or more firms  
  0  Free  entry 
      
 w
m   What are the legal conditions of entry into the mobile market? 
    6  Franchised to 1 firm  
    3  Franchised to 2 or more firms  
  0  Free  entry 
      
1/3     Public ownership
      
 (1-w
m)  
What percentage of shares in the public telecommunications 
operator is owned by the government? 
    % government ownership/100*6 
      
 w
m  
What percentage of shares in the largest firm ion the mobile 
telecommunications market is owned by the government? 
    % government ownership/100*6 
      
1/3     Market structure




What is the market share of new entrants in the trunk telephony 
market? 
    6-normalized market share
b 






What is the market share of new entrants in the international 
telephony market? 
    6-normalized market share
b 
      
 w
m  
What is the market share of new entrants in the mobile 
telephony market? 
    6-normalized market share
b 
    
a The weight w
m is the OECD-wide revenue share from mobile telephony in total revenue from trunk, 
international and mobile. The weight w
t is the OECD-wide revenue share of trunk in total revenue from 
trunk and international telephony.  
b The market share of new entrants has been normalized to be between 0 and 6 with 6 being the smallest 
market share over all countries and 0 being the largest. 
Source: OECD (2005b).   33
Table 4  OECD regulatory questionnaire for air passenger transport 
Weights 
by theme  
Question 
weights
a Score  Question 
      
1/2     Entry regulation 
      
 ½*w  
Does your country have an open skies agreement with the United 
States? 
   6  No 
   0  Yes 
     
 ½*w   Is your country participating in a regional agreement? 
   6  No 
   0  Yes 
     
 (1-w)  
Is the domestic aviation market in your country fully liberalized? 
That is, there are no restrictions on the number of (domestic) 
airlines that are allowed to operate on domestic routes? 
   6  No 
   0  Yes 
     
1/2     Public ownership
     
 1  
What percentage of shares in the largest carrier (domestic and 
international traffic combined) are owned by national, state or 
provincial authorities? 
    % of shares owned by government/100*6 
     
a The weight w is the average share of international traffic in total traffic (measured in ‘000 revenue 
passenger kilometres) for each country.  
Source: OECD (2005b). 
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Table 5  OECD questionnaire for entry regulation in the professions
a 
Weights 
by theme  
Question 
weights Score  Question 
      
2/5     Licensing 
      
 1  
How many services does the profession have an exclusive or 
shared exclusive right to provide? 
    6  More than 3 
   4.5  3 
   3  2 
   1.5  1 
   0  0 
     
2/5      Education requirements (only applies if licensing not 0) 
     
 1/3  
What is the duration of special education/university/or other 
higher degree? 
    Equals number of years of education (max of 6) 
     
 1/3  
What is the duration of compulsory practice necessary to become 
a full member of the profession? 
    Equals number of years of compulsory practice (max of 6) 
     
 1/3  
Are there professional exams that must be passed to become a full 
member of the profession? 
   6  Yes 
   0  No 
     
1/5     Quotas and economic needs tests
     
 1  
Is the number of foreign professionals/firms permitted to practice 
restricted by quotas or economic needs tests? 
   6  Yes 
   0  No 
     
a The indicator for each profession is calculated as the simple average of the indicators of entry (Table 4) 
and conduct (Table 5) regulation.  
Source: OECD (2005a).   35
Table 6  OECD questionnaire for conduct regulation in the professions
a 
Weights 
by theme  
Question 
weights Score  Question 
      
0.38     Regulations on prices and fees 
      
 1  
Are the fees or prices that a profession charges regulated in any 
way (by government or self-regulated)? 
    6  Minimum prices on all services 
    5  Minimum prices on some services 
    4  Maximum prices on all services 
    3  Maximum prices on some services 
    2  Non-binding recommended prices on all services  
    1  Non-binding recommended prices on some services 
   0  No  regulation 
     
0.23      Regulations on advertizing  
     
 1  
Is advertising and marketing by the profession regulated in any 
way? 
   6  Advertising  is  prohibited 
   3  Advertising  is  regulated 
    0  No specific regulations 
     
0.19     Regulations on form of business
     
 1   Is the legal form of business restricted to a particular type? 
    6  Sole practitioner only 
   5  Incorporation  forbidden 
    2  Partnership and some incorporation allowed 
   0  No  restrictions 
     
0.19     Quotas and economic needs tests
     
 1   Is cooperation between professionals restricted? 
   6  Generally  forbidden 
    4.5  Only allowed with comparable professions 
   3  Generally  allowed 
    0  All forms allowed 
     
a The indicator for each profession is calculated as the simple average of the indicators of entry (Table 4) 
and conduct (Ttable 5) regulation.  
Source: OECD (2005a). 
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index Score  Restriction 
      
     Restrictions on commercial presence 
      
0.1900 0.1900    Licensing 
    1.00  Issues no new banking licenses 
    0.75  Issues up to 3 new banking licenses with only prudential restrictions 
    0.50  Issues up to 6 new banking licenses with only prudential restrictions 
    0.25  Issues up to 10 new banking licenses with only prudential restrictions 
    0.00  Issues new banking licenses with only prudential restrictions 
     
0.1900 0.1900    Direct Investment 
    
The score will be inversely proportional to maximum equity 
participation permitted in an existing domestic bank. For example, 
ownership to a maximum of 49 percent of a bank would receive a 
score of 0.51. 
      
0.0950 0    No new licenses and JV arrangements 
   1.00 
Issues no new banking licenses and no entry is allowed through a joint 
venture with a domestic bank 
    0.50  Bank entry is only through a joint venture with a domestic bank 
   0.00 
No requirement for a bank to enter through a joint venture with a 
domestic bank 
     
0.0190 0    Movement of People - Permanent 
    1.00  No entry of executives, senior managers or specialists 
   0.80 
Executives, specialists and/or senior managers can stay a period of up 
to 1 year 
   0.60 
Executives, specialists and/or senior managers can stay a period of up 
to 2 years 
   0.40 
Executives, specialists and/or senior managers can stay a period of up 
to 3 years 
   0.20 
Executives, specialists and/or senior managers can stay a period of up 
to 4 years 
   0.00 
Executives, specialists and/or senior managers can stay a period of 
more than 5 years 
     
    Other Restrictions 
     
0.1425 0.1425    Raising funds by banks 
    1.00  Banks are unable to raise funds from domestic sources 
    0.75  Banks are restricted from raising funds from domestic capital markets 
   0.50 
Banks are restricted in accepting deposits from the public, or face 
interest rate controls 
   0.00 
Banks can raise funds from any source with only prudential 
restrictions 
Continued 
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index Score  Restriction 
      
    Lending funds by banks 
0.1425  0.1425  1.00  Banks are not permitted to lend to domestic clients 
   0.75 
Banks are restricted to specified lending size or lending to 
Government projects 
   0.5 
Banks are restricted in providing certain lending services such as 
leasing, credit cards and consumer finance 
   0.25 
Banks are directed to lend to certain sectors such as housing and small 
business 
    0.00  Banks can lend to any source with only prudential restrictions 
     
0.0950 0.0950    Other business of banks - insurance and securities services 
    1.00  Banks can only provide banking services 
   0.50 
Banks can provide banking services plus one other line of business - 
insurance or securities services 
    0.00  Banks have no restrictions on conducting other lines of business 
     
0.0475 0.0475    Expanding operations -  street branches, offices and ATMs 
    1.00  One banking outlet with no new banking outlets permitted 
    0.75  Number of bank outlets is limited in number and location 
   0.25 
Expansion of banking outlets is subject to non-prudential regulatory 
approval 
    0.00  No restrictions on banks expanding operations 
     
0.0095 0    Movement of people - Temporary 
    1.00  No temporary entry of executives, senior managers and/or specialists 
   0.75 
Temporary entry of executives, senior managers and/or specialists up 
to 30 days 
   0.50 
Temporary entry of executives, senior managers and/or specialists up 
to 60 days 
   0.25 
Temporary entry of executives, senior managers and/or specialists up 
to 90 days 
   0.00 
Temporary entry of executives, senior managers and/or specialists 
over 90 days 
     
0* 0    Movement of people - Board of Directors 
    1.00  Board cannot comprise of foreigners 
    0.00  No restrictions on the composition of the board of directors 
    
The score is inversely related to the percentage of the Board which 
can comprise of foreigners. For example, if 20% of a BOD can 
comprise of foreigners they would receive a score of 0.80. 
     
0.9310 0.8075      Total 
* Weight was 0.019 in McGuire and Schuele (2000). 
Source: Dee (2005), based on McGuire and Schuele (2000).  
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Table 8  Direct price impacts of Tunisia’s regulatory restrictions in selected 
services (percent) 
Sector   Direct price impact 
  via markups on  via costs
  output exports  to 
Tunisia 
Currently     
    
Telecommunications – domestic providersa  6.8  
                                  – foreign providersa  15.5  
Banking                    – domestic providers  7.5   
                                  – foreign providers  17.5   
Professional services – domestic providersb     6.0
                                  – foreign providersb  19.1 19.1 
    
After unilateral reform     
    
Telecommunications – domestic providersa  0.0  
                                  – foreign providersa  0.0  
Banking                    – domestic providers  4.9   
                                  – foreign providers  6.8   
Professional services – domestic providersb     6.0
                                  – foreign providersb  11.9 11.9 
    
After further bilateral reform     
    
Professional services – domestic providersb     6.0
                                  – foreign providersb  6.4 6.4 
a A simple average of price impacts for fixed line and cellular services. 
b Simple average of estimates for legal, accounting, and engineering services.   
Source: Dee (2005), based on Warren (2000), Kalirajan et al. (2000) and Nguyen-Hong (2000).  
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Table 9  Direct price impacts of bilateral air service agreements (percent) 
Destination countries  Origin countries 
  Tunisia  EU  GAFTA  Rest of world
Currently     
     
Tunisia  na 15.4 15.9  14.2
EU 15.4  0  12.3  16.9
GAFTA  15.5 12.3 15.9  14.9
Rest of world  14.2  18.2  14.9  18.3
     
After Tunisian open skies agreement with EU     
     
Tunisia na  0  15.9  14.2
EU 0  0  12.3  16.9
GAFTA  15.5 12.3 15.9  14.9
Rest of world  14.2  18.2  14.9  18.3
Source: Updated from Dee (2005), and based on Doove et al. (2001).    40
Table 10  Sectoral aggregation of the FTAP model 
Sectors in the FTAP model   Corresponding GTAP sectors
Live animals, products  Cattle, sheep goats, horses, animal products nec, meat, meat 
products nec 
Dairy products  Raw milk, dairy products
Coffee, etc, sugar, cut flowers  Sugar cane, crops nec, sugar
Fruit and veg  Vegetables
Cereals  Paddy rice, wheat, cereal grains, processed rice
Oil seeds and fats  Oil seeds, vegetable oils
Beverages and tobacco  Beverages and tobacco
Other agricultural products  Plant-based fibres, wool, silk-worm cocoons, forestry, food 
products nec
Fish and products  Fishing
Mineral products  Coal, oil, gas, minerals nec.
Metals, products  Ferrous metals, metals nec, metal products 
Chemical etc  Petroleum, coal products, chemical, rubber, plastic 
products, mineral products nec 
Leather products  Leather products 
Wood products, pulp, paper  Wood products, paper products, publishing 
Textiles and apparel  Textiles, wearing apparel 
Transport equipment   Motor vehicles and parts, transport equipment nec 
Other machinery and equipment   Machinery and equipment nec 
Electrical machinery  Electronic equipment 
Other manufacturing  Manufactures nec 
Electricity  Electricity 
Gas and water  Gas manufacture, distribution, water 
Construction  Construction 
Trade  Trade 
Other transport  Sea transport, transport nec 
Air transport  Air transport 
Communications Communication 
Other financial services   Financial services nec 
Insurance  Insurance 
Other business services  Business services nec 
Other services  Recreation and other services, public admin, defence, 
health, education, ownership of dwellings 
Source: Based on GTAP version 6 database.  
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Table 11  Welfare implications of Tunisian unilateral and bilateral services 
trade reform initiatives ($US million) 
Reform scenario  Welfare in  
  Tunisia  EU  GAFTA  Rest of world
Unilateral telecommunications reforms  21  -13  0  -1
Increased B2B ecommerce  31  4  1  0
Unilateral banking reforms   3  -2  0  0
Unilateral and bilateral reforms in the professions  17  2  0  -5
Open skies agreement with the EU  4  14  -2  -37
     
Total
a 77  4  -1  -42
     
Full reform in these sectors  175  -18  -2  -42
a Individual entries may not add to total because of interaction effects. 
Source: FTAP model projections.  
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Table 12  Implications of Tunisian unilateral and bilateral services trade 
reform initiatives for consumer and producer prices and real 
resource costs in Tunisia (percentage deviation from baseline) 





EU-owned  Tunisian 
owned 
EU-owned 
Electricity  0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0
Gas and water  0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0
Construction  0.3 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Trade  -0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
Other transport  0.4 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Air transport  5.1 -8.1 5.1 5.0 5.1 5.0
Communications  -4.8 0.0 -4.5 -5.3 2.0 9.3
Other financial services   -1.2 0.0 -1.1 -1.7 1.3 8.1
Insurance  0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Other business services  -0.5 -8.4 -0.4 -1.8 -0.4 9.9
Other services  0.8 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
a Producer prices are inclusive of rents from services trade barriers, while real resource costs are not.  
Source: FTAP model projections.  
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Table 13  Implications of Tunisian unilateral and bilateral services trade 




Tunisian firms owned by 
Tunisia EU  Rest of world
Live animals, products  -0.4 0.0 0.0
Dairy products  0.2 0.0 0.0
Coffee, etc, sugar, cut flowers  -0.6 -0.5 -0.5
Fruit and veg  -0.5 -0.4 -0.4
Cereals  -1.3 -1.2 -1.2
Oil seeds and fats  -0.9 0.0 0.0
Beverages and tobacco  -0.3 -0.2 -0.2
Other agricultural products  -1.3 -1.2 -1.2
Fish and products  0.0 0.0 0.0
Mineral products  -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Metals, products  -1.3 -1.2 -1.2
Chemical etc  -0.9 -0.9 -0.9
Leather products  -0.8 -0.7 -0.7
Wood products, pulp, paper  -0.5 -0.4 -0.4
Textiles and apparel  -1.0 -0.9 -0.9
Transport equipment   -0.7 -0.6 -0.6
Other machinery and equipment   1.3 1.4 1.4
Electrical machinery  -0.8 -0.8 -0.8
Other manufacturing  -0.7 -0.6 -0.6
Electricity  -0.3 0.0 0.0
Gas and water  -0.5 0.0 0.0
Construction  0.1 0.2 0.2
Trade  0.3 0.4 0.5
Other transport  -1.1 -1.0 0.0
Air transport  16.1 16.6 16.6
Communications  1.2 10.4 10.4
Other financial services   0.5 7.0 7.0
Insurance  0.4 0.5 0.5
Other business services  -0.7 14.9 7.8
Other services  -1.4 -1.3 -1.3
Source: FTAP model projections.  
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Table 14  Implications of Tunisian unilateral and bilateral services trade 
reform initiatives for sectoral export volumes from Tunisia 
(percentage deviation from baseline) 
 
Sector  
Exports from Tunisian firms owned by 
Tunisia EU  Rest of world
Live animals, products  -5.6 0.0 0.0
Dairy products  -1.3 0.0 0.0
Coffee, etc, sugar, cut flowers  -1.5 -1.5 -1.5
Fruit and veg  -3.9 -3.8 -3.8
Cereals  -2.6 -2.5 -2.5
Oil seeds and fats  -0.9 0.0 0.0
Beverages and tobacco  -4.4 -4.3 -4.3
Other agricultural products  -1.7 -1.6 -1.6
Fish and products  -2.3 -2.2 -2.2
Mineral products  -0.1 0.0 0.0
Metals, products  -1.8 -1.7 -1.7
Chemical etc  -1.2 -1.1 -1.1
Leather products  -1.0 -0.9 -0.9
Wood products, pulp, paper  -1.2 -1.1 -1.1
Textiles and apparel  -1.0 -0.9 -0.9
Transport equipment   -1.1 -1.0 -1.0
Other machinery and equipment   1.3 1.4 1.4
Electrical machinery  -1.2 -1.2 -1.2
Other manufacturing  -1.1 -1.0 -1.0
Electricity  -3.9 0.0 0.0
Gas and water  -3.4 0.0 0.0
Construction  -3.3 -3.2 -3.2
Trade  2.3 2.4 2.4
Other transport  -2.7 -2.6 0.0
Air transport  28.3 28.8 28.8
Communications  58.6 73.1 73.2
Other financial services   11.7 18.9 18.9
Insurance  -0.9 -0.8 -0.8
Other business services  29.1 49.4 40.1
Other services  -8.1 -8.0 -8.0
Source: FTAP model projections.  
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Table 15  Structure of the Tunisian economy before and after unilateral and 
bilateral services trade reforms  
In benchmark equilibrium After reforms
Output ($US million)  37758 37811
   Services share (%)  48.4 48.7
 
Value added at factor cost ($US million)  16335 16600
   Services share (%)  67.0 67.5
 
Intermediate usage ($US million)  20439 20347
   Services share (%)  34.0 33.9
 
Household consumption ($US million)  11611 11693
   Services share (%)  37.8 37.8
 
Investment ($US million)  5402 5421
   Services share (%)  59.0 59.0
 
Government consumption ($US million)  3006 3027
   Services share (%)  100.0 100.00
 
Imports cif ($US million)  10355 10438
   Services share  10.6 10.9
 
Exports fob ($US million)  8976 9052
   Services share (%)  25.0 26.2
 
Export share of output (%)  23.8 23.9
 
Foreign ownership share of output (%)  15.37 15.40
Source: FTAP model database and projections.  
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Table 16  Tunisia’s tariff structure, 2005 





 ($US $ million)
Live animals, products  91.8 91.8 40.5
Dairy products  94.2 95.3 42.2
Coffee, etc, sugar, cut flowers  66.1 70.3 188.5
Fruit and veg  94.6 96.8 61.7
Cereals  45.1 45.3 342.3
Oil seeds and fats  38.0 42.6 309.9
Beverages and tobacco  23.9 31.3 70.7
Other agricultural products  21.8 28.0 126.8
Fish and products  40.0 40.1 28.7
Mineral products  5.3 25.6 584.8
Metals, products  4.0 20.4 1051.1
Chemical etc  2.1 15.5 1371.4
Leather products  7.6 32.8 270.1
Wood products, pulp, paper  8.2 31.6 426.2
Textiles and apparel  9.1 31.1 2464.8
Transport equipment   4.1 18.3 924.4
Other machinery and equipment   2.7 12.5 1474.5
Electrical machinery  5.1 24.0 1448.7
Other manufacturing  4.2 23.7 396.8
Source: WTO (2005).  
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Table 17  Estimates of the tariff equivalents of ad valorem and specific tariffs 
and tariff rate quotas on Tunisian imports, 2001 (percent) 
Sector    Imports from EU Imports from 
GAFTA 
Imports from Rest 
of World
Live animals, products  87.9 18.8 75.4
Dairy products  60.7 9.2 108.3
Coffee, etc, sugar, cut flowers  78.6 20.9 21.2
Fruit and veg  74.0 67.0 85.1
Cereals  87.7 15.4 56.6
Oil seeds and fats  14.7 114.1 21.8
Beverages and tobacco  32.5 17.2 34.8
Other agricultural products  28.4 12.4 45.9
Fish and products  41.4 20.4 27.0
Mineral products  7.2 6.0 16.4
Metals, products  9.3 16.7 27.0
Chemical etc  6.0 7.9 25.9
Leather products  14.5 21.0 38.1
Wood products, pulp, paper  16.8 14.6 25.6
Textiles and apparel  18.0 9.0 32.6
Transport equipment   7.5 13.4 19.5
Other machinery and equipment   7.9 7.4 18.2
Electrical machinery  4.8 12.4 20.3
Other manufacturing  21.7 19.3 34.0
Source: GTAP version 6 database.     48
Table 18  Welfare implications of Tunisian reform of agricultural and 
manufacturing protection (US $ million) 
Reform scenario  Welfare in  
  Tunisia  EU  GAFTA  Rest of world
Tunisia removes border protection on agriculture 
from the EU 
114 63 13 -52
EU reciprocates  295  -70  -1  3
10 percent productivity improvement in Tunisia’s 
agricultural exportables 
258 58 12  5
Subtotal
a 733  183  23  -61
Tunisia eliminates remaining tariffs on 
manufactures from EU 
-184 417  -3 -133
Tunisia lowers tariffs on manufactures from other 
sources by 25 percent 
74 -38  3  65
Subtotal
a -104  388  -1  -93
Total
a 641  570  22  -153
     
Full unilateral liberalization in manufacturing  65  203  6  210
a Individual entries may not add to total because of interaction effects. 
Source: FTAP model projections.  
 
 